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W
e ignore the downward spiral of general Internal
Medicine at our peril. Fewer graduates are choosing
primary care residencies and practicing generalists liken their
jobs to a hamster on a treadmill.
1 Anyone who has tried to
recruit a clinical General Internist lately will attest to the
dwindling supply. Meanwhile, demand grows each year. The
graphic display of changes in residency positions illustrated by
the Blue Ribbon Panel of the Society of General Internal
Medicine (SGIM)
2 is a wake up call to those who believe
General Internists will play an important role in caring for
the growing number of elderly.
The policy monograph developed by the Blue Ribbon Panel
of the Society of SGIM outlines principles that would promote a
coordinated care model for general Internal Medicine.
2 The
model proposes General Internists should be more than simply
the provider of first (primary) care; they should be the chief
executive of a health care team providing efficient, electronic
health record (EHR)-supported, longitudinal care that
improves health and prevents disease. Like Mom and apple
pie, it is hard to disagree with these principles.
All of us would agree that enhancement of technology to
support our practice via an EHR would pay major dividends
and provide a mechanism to assess quality. However, outlining
a “straw man” as a model to work from would have helped to
make the proposed model less conceptual and more opera-
tional. For example, what kind of team do we need and how
many participants should be involved? What are the designat-
ed roles of such individuals and how can we financially justify
the team? Could the use of nurse practitioners and other
health professionals further advance the model?
Irrespective of how the new model would be constructed, the
important recurrent theme in the document, and an obvious
key to realizing the vision of coordinated care, is that current
payment systems must be modified. The current reimburse-
ment system for general Internal Medicine has 2 underlying
flaws representing a significant barrier to achieving the vision
of coordinated care. First, overall reimbursement to General
Internists is currently too low to support true high-quality
coordinated care. Practicing General Internists have increased
productivity not only because of the rising volume of patients,
but because of declining reimbursement and salary. Continu-
ing to increase clinical productivity to make up for shortfalls in
reimbursement rates will be progressively more difficult as the
population ages, however, as more patients will require longer
visits to manage multiple and complex medical issues. This
brings us to the second underlying flaw in the system. Visit-
based reimbursement mechanisms are not aligned with the
goals of providing comprehensive care—much of which could
be provided outside of the traditional doctor–patient visit.
Whereas some payers will pay for telephone calls with patients
and web-based doctor “visits,” most do not.
Interestingly, it seems that the General Internists in retainer-
medicine (“concierge”) practices are the only General Internists
who are happy these days. They charge patients an annual fee
to pay for services not otherwise covered by insurance,
allowing them to provide more comprehensive care—albeit to
a smaller number of patients than the average General
Internist.
The payment system suggested by Goroll et al.
3 draws
significantly from the retainer medicine model. Starting where
the SGIM Blue Ribbon Panel left off, Goroll and colleagues
suggest a comprehensive care model based on payment of a
monthly risk-adjusted retainer fee for each patient in a
comprehensive care practice. If, as they suggest, the net of
these monthly retainer payments is significantly larger than
the current collection of fee-for-service payments, then this
payment methodology would overcome both of the fundamen-
tal flaws inherent in our current payment system (i.e.,
reimbursement that represents a net increase from current
levels and is not tied to the office visit). No doubt, such a
retainer payment system would enable General Internists to
invest in EHRs, assemble the health care team, and provide
comprehensive care to their patients—fulfilling the principles
outlined in the SGIM monograph.
Without moving back to capitation, a per-member-per-
month payment to support coordinated care would likely
improve our system. However, there are potential pitfalls as
one looks beyond general medicine. For example, how confi-
dent are we that by spending more time with patients, General
Internists can wring out enough savings to offset the net
increase in the comprehensive payment? If General Internists
cannot generate savings from enhanced medical management,
should they expect a reallocation of funds from specialists to
cover the increases?
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424Some may favor a reexamination of the financial worth of
procedural activities. Yet, many subspecialists play a key role
in the successful management and outcome of complex
patients, enriching the quality of life. Further, it is unlikely
that subspecialists will lie down quietly and let the monies flow
from the subspecialty procedural to nonprocedural-based
Internists without a fight. Certainly, the generalist’s struggle
to increase payments in the RBRVS system indicates that
reallocating payments from specialists to generalists will be
neither quick nor easy.
Goroll grapples with the scenario where a subspecialist
effectively becomes the primary caregiver based on an overrid-
ing complex chronic medical condition (e.g., end stage renal
disease [ESRD]). In this case, the patient may be better served
staying with the subspecialist rather than the General Inter-
nist. How should such physicians be incorporated in this
model? Would the General Internist here play more of a
“subspecialist” role? Depending on the practice, could the
subspecialist have a coordinated care team just like an
Internist with similar financial arrangements and have the
General Internist in such a scenario be a consultant?
In the case of a patient with ESRD, the retainer payment
could be made to the specialist instead of the generalist. But
how would the retainer payment be allocated in the case of a
generalist who tends to refer frequently? What safeguards
would protect against a generalist who simply amasses
patients, collects the coordination retainer fee, but instead of
coordinating care simply orchestrates referrals (shifting the
time and cost of care to specialists)? Who would decide how
many patients a generalist should have? Unless panel sizes are
limited in some way or there are strict performance standards,
then we may find ourselves back where we are now with
physicians rushing patients through the office to enhance the
bottom line. Performance measures would be critical to
monitor the success of any such system.
We also cannot forget that an important driver of our health
system is the patient, and many desire to see subspecialists.
Patients will want to preserve the opportunity to seek expert
guidance on selected conditions given the increasing complex-
ity of diagnostic testing and management. In fact, in some
settings, referral to a subspecialist may be more cost effective
than evaluation by a primary care physician.
Clearly, before any change, pilot studies would be instru-
mental in defining the feasibility, appropriate size of staff, and
the impact on quality. Perhaps with such pilot studies, quality
measures could be better delineated and policies developed to
protect against “gaming” the system.
In summary, lack of alignment between the current primary
care payment mechanism and the elements required to
provide high quality comprehensive continuity health care
represents a fundamental flaw in our health care system. This
has had a deleterious effect on our ability to attract the best
and brightest to general Internal Medicine. Many Internal
Medicine house staff seek subspecialty training because of
the problems they see in general Internal Medicine, the
reimbursement advantage of the subspecialist, and the per-
ception of a decline in the overall management domain of the
General Internist.
The SGIM policy monograph and the comprehensive pay-
ment methodology paper by Goroll et al propose a bold
rethinking of what it means to be a General Internist. These
papers accurately describe the current problems facing the
field of general Internal Medicine and propose solutions
addressing the lack of alignment between payment mecha-
nisms and the goals of General Internists. We cannot solve the
general Internal Medicine problem in isolation, however. To be
successful, any new model for coordinated care must also
create incentives to provide care that is highly integrated
between specialist and generalist. Reforming payment
mechanisms will be critical to driving this change and aligning
incentives. These 2 papers help us comprehend the potential of
coordinated comprehensive care. Can we realize the potential?
We believe the answer is yes, but the devil is in the dollars.
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